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The aim of this paper is to shift the focus of thinking about creativity from functional/computational accounts to experiential ones. My main claim is that what is distinctive of creative mental processes is not a functional/computational mechanism, be it the recombination of old ideas or the transformation of one’s conceptual space, but the way in which this mental process is experienced. 
	I start with a clarification of what the explanandum of theories of creativity is supposed to be and contrast creativity, an on-observable attribute of mental processes, with originality, an observable attribute of the products of mental processes and limit the discussion to creativity (Section II). After arguing that creativity is not a functional/computational natural kind, I sketch an experiential account of creativity and argue that it comes closer to capturing what is distinctive about creativity than functional/computational accounts (Section III-IV). Finally, I argue that although experiential and functional/computational accounts of creativity are not exclusive of one another, the experiential account I propose has significant explanatory advantage over any functional/computational accounts in explaining some of the most important and historically most influential features of creativity (Section V). 

II. Creativity and originality

First, we have to be clear about what we are trying to explicate. What is creativity an attribute of? We often talk about the creativity of acts, (mental) processes, ideas, people and artifacts. The connection between these notions is intricate. And a further important question is which one of these notions, if any, is explanatorily basic. If we manage to explain, say, what constitutes the creativity of ideas, will all the other notions of creativity come for free? Can we reduce the creativity of artifacts to the creativity of the acts that produce it? These are thorny questions and there is no clear agreement in the literature as to how to proceed (see Briskman 1980). 
Many philosophers of art seem to assume that the explanatorily basic notion is that of the creativity of artifacts (for example, Carroll 2003, but see Gaut 2003, p. 151 for a dissenting view), and all the other notions of creativity can be defined with the help of this notion. This also seems to be the strategy of those who argue about whether computers are capable of producing something creative (Finke 1995, Schooler and Melcher 1995). Psychologists, in contrast, seem to think that it is the creativity of ideas or of mental processes that we should first and foremost explain (Boden 1990, 1994a, Simonton 1999, Harré 1981, Polanyi 1981, see Taylor 1988 for a good summary). 
The difference between these two explanatory projects has been made explicit by a number of distinctions in the creativity literature. Fred D’Agostino, for example, distinguishes between subjective and inter-subjective creativity (D’Agostino 1986, p. 174-175). Inter-subjective creativity is an attribute of artifacts, whereas subjective creativity is an attribute of acts (D’Agostino 1986, p. 175). Similarly, Ian Jarvie talks about subjective and objective creativity: subjective creativity, as he puts it, is “a property of persons or their minds”, whereas objective creativity is “a property […] of created works” (Jarvie 1981, p. 117). Francis Sparshott also talks about two different uses of the term ‘creative process’. It can refer to “all processes, whatever they may be, whose outcome meets some appropriate criteria for originality” (Sparshott 1981, p. 61). In other words, it can refer to a process that leads to objective/inter-subjective creativity. And it can refer to a specific process that is itself held to be (subjectively) creative. 
Yet another distinction comes from Margaret Boden. Boden distinguishes psychological or P-creativity and historical or H-creativity (Boden 1992, pp. 32-25, Boden 1994, p. 77). An idea is H-creative if and only if it is P-creative and it has never occurred before.​[1]​ 
It follows from Boden’s definition that P-creativity is necessary but not sufficient for H-creativity. It seems clear that P-creativity is not sufficient for H-creativity. If Bill has a P-creative idea on Monday and Jane, independently of Bill, has a P-creative idea a day after, then Jane’s idea is not H-creative, because Bill has already had the same idea. But Jane’s idea is just as P-creative as Bill’s. It is much less clear that, as Boden claims, P-creativity is necessary for H-creativity. There may be works of art or scientific inventions that we all consider to be H-creative, but we have no evidence that it was produced in a P-creative manner. 
I think that it is important to draw a distinction between something like subjective/P-creativity on the one hand and objective/H-creativity on the other. But I will draw this distinction somewhat differently.
Creativity and originality are often used as synonyms. I think this is a mistake. Being original is usually contrasted with being derivative: an idea, for example, is original if it is not derived from someone else’s idea. A scientific discovery or an artwork is original if it is new and not derivative.​[2]​ Whether a scientific discovery or artwork is original tells us relatively little nothing about the nature of the mental process of the person who produced it. Originality is a publicly observable property of normally publicly observable entities (not just of physical objects, but also of styles, utterances and behavior). 
Creativity, in contrast, is not normallysomething publicly observable. It is a feature of our mental processes. Being creative is not contrasted with being derivative, but with being mechanicalstic (see, for example, Gaut 2003, pp. 150-151).​[3]​ Whether a mental process is creative tells us nothing about what kind of publicly observable entities (if any) it produces. Some artists’ and scientists’ mental processes are creative, but so are many of those who are solving crossword puzzles or killing time at the airport with a difficult sudoku.
There is no simple connection between these two notions. Creativity is neither necessary, nor sufficient for originality.​[4]​ A scientific discovery can be original and still be the product of a purely mechanicalstic mental process, which is, by definition, not creative. Goodyear’s often quoted discovery of vulcanization is a possible example (but see Section IV for further wrinkles). Another example is the following. If I write a letter of recommendation for a student of mine and I emphasize how original her work is, I do not thereby also comment on her mental processes. I don’t know much about the functional/computational structure of her mental processes, but I know their outcome: that her research is very original. 
Conversely, the products of a creative mental process can be completely banal and derivative. Suppose that I am in high school and I am trying to solve a math problem. There is a mechanicalstic way to solve it: I have to try out all the natural numbers between 1 and 999 one by one and one of them will be the solution. But there is also a creative way of solving it. If I manage to solve it in the creative manner, my mental process is creative (it is not mechanicalstic), but the product of this mental process is not original at all: all the other students in my class solve the very same math problem, after all. 
There are epistemic worries about the attribution of both creativity and of originality, although these worries are quite different in the two cases. Creativity is not publicly observable, so we have to rely either on the introspection of our own creativity or on verbal accounts of others. Originality is publicly observable, but it is often difficult to tell whether an act or idea is original because we often have limited information about whether it has occurred before. 
The distinction between creativity and originality could be thought to be a version of Ian Jarvie’s distinction between subjective and objective creativity (Jarvie 1981, p. 117). But it is important to note that while Jarvie claims that subjective creativity is “of no interest” in and of itself (Jarvie 1981, p. 117), the aim of this paper is to understand the difference between (subjectively) creative and non-creative mental processes. 
Creativity, as I understand it, is quite a banal phenomenon: it is not to be restricted to the mental processes of a select few: Beethoven, Einstein and the like. It is something much more common and much less mysterious. Originality, in contrast, is much rarer. There are many fascinating questions about originality that are usually discussed as questions about creativity (Carroll 2003, Olsen 2003), but I will leave all of them on the side. 
I am interested in creativity and this paper aims to give an account of the difference between mental processes that are creative and mental processes that are not. It is important that the account I propose is an account of creative mental processes.​[5]​ As we have seen, the concept of creativity is often also used as an attribute of other entities, such as persons. I do not claim that these uses of the concept will reduce to the creativity of mental processes (whether a person is creative, for example, probably depends on whether she creates something original than not just on whether her mental processes tend to be creative). 
The explanation of the creativity of mental processes does not presuppose an account of originality, as whether a creative act has occurred before should not matter when describing how the mind works when one is thinking creatively. One could, however, argue that an account of creativity should give at least some guidance about the attribution of originality. I will return to this question briefly in the last section. 

III. The experiential account of creativity

We have an explanandum: how the mind works when one is thinking creatively. To put it differently, the account I aim to give here aims to explain the difference between creative and non-creative mental processes. 
	There are two influential widespread strategies to talk about the difference between creative and non-creative mental processes. The first one is to claim that this difference is a functional/computational difference. Say, creative mental processes are those types of mental processes that transform one’s conceptual space, whereas non-creative ones are the ones that don’t (Boden 1992, 1994a – note that this is Boden’s account of radical creativity, not of creativity per se). Or, creative mental processes are bisociative ones and only these mental processes are bisociative (Koestler 1975, 1981). It is important to note that these explanations explain a mental process-type (creative mental processes) in terms of a functional/computational process type (bisociation, transformation of conceptual space, recombination, etc) and this functional/computational process is supposed to be the one that is causally responsible for the emergence of the creative idea/thought. 
	The second strategy is to deny that any psychological explanation is possible. There are many versions of this claim (Feyerabend 1987, Jarvie 1981, Hausman 1981, 1984, Hospers 1985 and see Stokes 2007 for criticism). It has been argued that the difference between creativity and non-creative mental processes cannot be explained at all, maybe because creativity is a one off phenomenon, where every token of creativity is different, and therefore no mental process type that would be responsible for creativity can be identified (Jarvie 1981). Another, old and influential, version of this view is that although we can explain this difference, it is not a psychological difference: it is not our doing, but either a result of divine intervention (as Plato claims) or of our mysterious subconscious (as Freud does). In other words, even if there is an explanation for creativity (say, divine intervention), this explanation is not a psychological one. 
An advantage of, and the main inspiration for, the functional/computational account is that it would make it possible to build creative computers. If creativity is a matter of instantiating a functional/computational process, then computers can do it as much as we can. And, conversely, some of the claims about the impossibility of a psychological account of creativity are fuelled by doubts about computer creativity. I will return to the question of computer creativity at the end of the paper.
My claim is that the difference between creative and non-creative mental processes is a psychological difference, but not a functional/computational one. In short, this difference is constituted by the way our mental processes are experienced.
	Thus, I am making a negative and a positive claim. The negative claim is that what is distinctive about creativity is unlikely to be a functional/computational process type. I will argue for this claim in this section. My positive claim is that what is distinctive about creativity is still something psychological: the way our mental processes are experienced. I will explicate this claim in the next section. 
	My negative claim is that what is distinctive about creativity is unlikely to be a functional/computational process type (Weisberg 1993 argues for a version of this claim). A simple fact to notice is that no functional/computational account proposed so far is without counterexamples. I will only mention two of the most influential such theories. Margaret Boden’s account, according to which (radical) creativity implies the transformation of our conceptual space, has been criticized for not seems to fail to covering some clear cases of creativity (Novitz 1999, pp. 68-70). Novitz’s account, according to which creativity implies the mere recombination of old ideas (Novitz 1999), in turn, also fails to cover all cases of creativity (including the ones Boden was focusing on, see Boden 2001).​[6]​ One could, of course, defend one of these functional/computational accounts from the alleged counterexamples (Novitz 2003 attempted to do exactly this). One could also try to combine these accounts, but this does not seem to be an easy task: while for Novitz recombination is the key element of the functional/computational processes responsible for creativity, Boden flatly denies that recombination would have anything to do with genuine creativity. 
I would favor a more pluralist approach. Creative mental processes can be implemented by more than one functional/computational process. Boden is (partly) right: her functional/computational explanation for the emergence of creative ideas is the right kind of functional/computational in some cases of creative mental processes. But Novitz is also (partly) right: his account gives us the right way to explain some other cases of creative mental processes. But neither account is satisfactory as a general account of the difference between creative and non-creative mental processes. 
Not all mental phenomena form a functional/computational natural kind. Being in love, for example, is unlikely to be a functional/computational natural kind. The same goes for being happy. My claim is that creativity is also unlikely to be a functional/computational natural kind (see also Bundy 1994, who makes a similar point). What is in common between the diverse mental processes we take to be creative is not something functional/computational, but something experiential. 
It is important that I am not denying that for each token creative process there is (or at least can be) a functional/computational process that implements this creative processleads to the emergence of the creative idea.. What I deny is that there is anything interesting in common between these token processes (besides the fact that they all implement lead to the emergence of creative processesideas). Creativity comes in different (functional/computational) forms: some creative mental processes involve a mere recombination of old ideas. Some others involve a radical transformation of our conceptual space.​[7]​ The functional/computational level is not the right level of analysis if we want to explain the difference between creative and non-creative processes. 
Does this make creativity miraculous? Definitely not. Each token creative mental process is realized by a token series of neuron firings. So are token instances of happiness or of being in love. The point is that what is in common between these neural events is unlikely to be captured in functional/computational terms. But, like in the case of happiness and being in love, it can be captured in experiential terms. 
A functional/computational and an experiential explanation of a creative mental process are not exclusive of one another. I believe that a full explanation of creative mental processes would require both. But I do think that the experiential description captures something about creative processes in general, whereas the functional/computational description does not. And I also think that many important features of creativity can be explained by the experiential explanations (rather than the functional/computational ones). 
In the next section, I outline an what characterizes the experiential account natural kind of creativity. In section V, I argue that much of what needs to be explained about creativity can be explained by these experiential characteristics rather than functional/computational ones. 

IV. The experience of creativity

Margaret Boden argues that an idea is (radically) creative if and only if “the person in whose mind it arises could not (in the relevant sense of ‘could not’) have had it before” (Boden 1994a, p. 76). There are notable difficulties spelling out what is meant by the ‘relevant sense of could not’ and there may be some questions about weather , as we have seen, there are some serious doubt that this account could apply in the case of all instances of (radical) creativity (see Novitz 1999, pp. 68-70). But Boden is almost right: we could rephrase her definition in the following manner: an idea is creative only if the person in whose mind it arises experiences it as something she has not taken to be possible before. 
	So the claim is that it is a necessary feature for creative mental processes that their outcome is experienced in a certain way: that we experience the outcome of the mental process as something we have not taken to be possible before. But what does it mean to say that an experience represents a mental process as something the agent has not taken to be possible before? What sense of possibility (or rather the lack thereof) is in play here? My answer is simple. At time t, the agent considered a number of possibilities to be exhaustive. Later, at time t*, she comes up with a possibility that she experiences as something that is different from all the possibilities she considered to be exhaustive at time t. 
	So far, I only set a necessary condition for creative mental processes. My claim was that the most we can say about the necessary condition for creative mental processes is that they are experienced as something we have not taken to be possible before. It is important that this is a necessary and not a sufficient condition. But if we add a couple of further conditions, we may be in the position to give (or at least come close to giving) a necessary and sufficient condition for creativity. 
	It is important to note that the aim of this paper is not to give a necessary and sufficient condition for creativity – creativity is an ordinary language concept and it may be difficult to capture its meaning with strict necessary and sufficient conditions. The aim of the paper is to argue that the right kind of analysis for the concept of creativity should be about our experiences (rather than functional/computational mechanisms). . I willdo suggest a rudimentary way of thinking about the necessary and sufficient conditions account of creativity, but the main aim is not to defend the details of this account, but to argue that this is the kind of account we should be looking for if we want to understand creativity. 
	Further, even if we find a necessary and sufficient condition for creativity in terms of our experiences, this does not mean that these experiences are causally responsible for the emergence of our creative ideas. It is neural processes that are causally responsible for the emergence of our creative ideas. My claim is that in order to capture some of the crucial features of creative processes, we need to analyze them on the experiential level. 
I can experience an idea as something I have not taken to be possible before, but I may be wrong: experiences can misrepresent. I may experience an idea as creative: as something I have not taken to be possible before, but maybe I had taken it to be possible before, but I forgot that I had. Thus, if we want to give a (close to) sufficient condition for creativity, we need to add that the experience that defines creative mental processes needs to be veridical: the idea in question really needs to be something I have not taken to be possible before – it is not enough if I experience it as such.​[8]​ 
There is a further wrinkle: we also need to rule out cases where we do experience something as a possibility we haven’t considered before and this experience is even veridical, but we know it for sure that we didn’t come up with this novel possibility ourselves: we know that our friend Bill told us about it. Hearing Bill suggesting a thus far unexplored possibility is clearly not a creative mental process. Thus, we need to add to our characterization of creativity that the novel idea is not only experienced as something we have not considered to be possible before, but it is notalso experienced as something we have not learned from someone else. We may experience it as something we come up with or as something that ‘just popped into our head’, but we don’t experience it as something we know to come from someone else. So a rudimentary necessary and sufficient condition for creativity is that a mental process is creative if and only if it produces an idea that is veridically experienced as something we have not thought to be possible before and as something we have not learned from someone else. 
There may be some further conditions we need to add in order to arrive at a genuine necessary and sufficient condition for creativity. But again, the aim of this paper is not to argue for some strict necessary and sufficient condition for creativity. The aim of this paper is to argue that the right level for the characterization of (and for giving a necessary and sufficient condition for) creativity is not the functional/computational level, but the experiential one. 
My claim was that creativity is not a functional/computational natural kind, but (if it is a natural kind at all), it is an experiential one. Hence, I need to examine whether my experiential account covers the prime examples of creative (and of non-creative) mental processes. 
Suppose that a creative mental process is creative in Boden’s sense: “the person in whose mind it arises could not (in the relevant sense of ‘could not’) have had it before” (Boden 1994a, p. 76). If so, then it sounds right to say that we also experience it as such: as something that we could not have had before. But this implies that we experience it as something that we have not taken to be possible before. Hence, those mental processes that count as creative according to Boden’s definition will also count as creative according to mine. 
How about a mental process that are the recombination of already existing ideas in a surprising manner (Novitz 1999, 2003)? The second one of Novitz’s three necessary conditions for creativity is that the result of the creative recombination process is surprising (Novitz 1999, p. 77). But being surprising seems to imply that it is experienced as novel and I argued that one way of explaining the experience of novelty would be to say that it is an experience of something we haven’t thought to be possible before. Again, those mental processes that count as creative according to Novitz’s definition, arguably, also count as creative according to mine.
Finally, an important example for a non-creative mental process is Charles Goodyear’s discovery of vulcanization. He apparently dropped random substances, including cream cheese, into liquid rubber until he stumbled upon sulphur, which is capable of vulcanizing rubber. Was this a creative act? Most theories of creativity assume that it was not (Novitz 1999, p. 75, Novitz 2003, p. 190, n. 14, Gaut 2003, p. 171, n. 6). I am not so sure. I think that we do not have enough information to judge. If Goodyear put all the substances found in his lab, including cream cheese and sulphur, in a row and then dropped them into liquid rubber one after another to see what happens, then I agree with the mainstream view that his act was not creative: it was a prime example of a mechanicalstic act. When he discovered that putting sulphur in liquid rubber leads to the vulcanization of rubber, he is unlikely to have experienced this idea as something he has not thought to be possible before. He clearly has, as sulphur was one of the substances he was going to try out. 
But maybe he did not proceed this way. Maybe he tried all kinds of substances, including cream cheese without success and then got stuck. He thought that he has tried everything that has a chance of succeeding in vulcanizing rubber. If cream cheese didn’t do it, what could? And then maybe it occurred to him that he didn’t think of sulphur. Thus, in this scenario, he experienced the idea of trying sulphur as something that he had not thought of as a possibility before. Thus, according to my definition, he was indeed creative. 
My conclusion is that we don’t have enough information to judge whether Goodyear was creative. It is also important to note that what is interesting about Goodyear’s example has little to do with creativity. What is striking about it is that he was incredibly lucky. He did not know that for vulcanization, rubber, a macromolecular chain (polyisoprene), needs to be mixed with a substance that is capable of forming cross-links between two points of the chain, which would make the chain form a dense and flexible network. If he had known that, the space of possibilities would have been quite limited and finding sulphur in it would have been quite easy. The point is that he had no idea. So, for him, the space of possibilities for what to use for vulcanizing was vast – it included cream cheese, after all. And he did manage to find one of the very few substances that can be used for vulcanization. That he picked out sulphur out of a very vast set in itself says nothing about whether his thought process was creative. In order to determine that, we would need to know more about how the idea of mixing sulphur with rubber came about in his mind. 
A couple of potential objections need to be addressed. First, it may seem that my account over-intellectualizes the creative process. Small kids are capable of creativity, but it may seem dubious that they even possess concepts like possibility. Note, however, that experiencing an idea as something I have not taken to be possible before does not necessarily imply possessing the concept of possibility. Take the following analogy: animals can experience objects as edible, that is, as things that are possible to eat, but that does not imply that they master the concept of possibility (see Rodriguez-Pereyra 2002, p. 94, Peacocke XE "Peacocke"  2001). 
Second, take Billy, the not particularly bright student. He is trying to solve a math problem but it’s just not happening. All other students have already solved the same problem, but Billy is still trying. Finally, he manages to solve it: further, he does experience the solution as something he had not taken to be possible before. So, in my account, he was creative. But was he? It seems that few would call him creative though. Note that Billy’s case is a counterexample to the sufficiency claim, not the necessary one I defended here. This case does not show that my account is incorrect, only that there may be additional conditions to add to the necessary condition I have been defending, besides the ones I have already added above, in order to get a necessary and sufficient condition for creativity. But, again, I am not sure that finding a necessary and sufficient condition for a concept like creativity is possible or in fact desirable. My aim is to show that if we were to look for one, we should be looking at experiential factors. 
Finally, I want to be clear what the experiential account of creativity does not give us. It will never give us a recipe for how to be creative. My claim is that the difference between creative and non-creative mental processes is that the former (but not the latter) are experienced in a certain distinctive way. This claim is utterly useless if we want to find out how to be creative. Functional/computational accounts, in contrast, would give at least some hint as to what thought processes to follow if one wants to be creative – transforming one’s conceptual space or recombining one’s existing thoughts, for example. But I am not sure that the inability to give a recipe for creativity is a disadvantage of my account. An important and historically influential question about creativity is whether it can be learned or taught (see Boden 2001 and Lucas 2001 for summaries and Gaut (this volume)). But this is a different question from whether there is a recipe for being creative. If we accept the experiential account, we need to say that there is no privileged recipe for creativity: there are many ways of being creative.  It may be taught and learned, but there is no royal road to creativity. 

V. Functional/computational accounts versus experiential accounts of creativity

As I noted earlier, a functional/computational account and the experiential account of creativity I outlined above should not be thought of as mutually exclusive. My account is consistent with, and it can be supplemented with, any of the major functional/computational theory of creativity. And a functional/computational theory of creativity needs to be able to say something about how creativity is being experienced. In this section, I argue that experiential accounts have greater explanatory power in explaining some of the crucial features of creativity than the functional/computational ones – given that the most salient features of creativity are experiential ones, this claim should not come as a surprise. 
I will consider three features of creativity that are taken to be important enough so that any comprehensive theory of creativity must be able to explain (or at least say something about) them. There may, of course, be many more such features. But I will focus on these three as they have played an important role in shaping our conception of creativity. 

(a)	A theory of creativity needs to be able to explain why it is a tempting intuition that suggests that creativity is something that happens to us, rather than something we do. 
(b)	A theory of creativity needs to be able to explain why the experience of the appreciation of other people’s creativity can seemis similar to the experience of one’s own creativity. 
(c)	A theory of creativity needs to be able to explain why we take creative actions to be genuine actions and not mere bodily movements.

I will take these three features in turn and elaborate on them.

V. (a) Explaining why it is a tempting intuition that suggests that creativity is something that happens to us, rather than something we do

This is maybe the most important intuition we seem to have about creative mental processes. It is unlikely to be correct (I see no reason why creativity would, by definition, be something that happens to us), but that is not important for our purposes: the question is why it is tempting to hold this intuition. This intuitionIt leads smoothly to attributing creativity to divine intervention or to the subconscious and it also fuels claims about the impossibility of explaining creativity. Because this intuition that creativity seems to happen to us feeds into claims that creativity is inexplicable or that it is to be attributed to something supernatural or subconscious, it is important to differentiate the intuition to be explained here and the stronger claims this intuition can give rise to. 
	The intuition we are trying to capture is neatly summarized by Mozart, in a letter that is probably a forgery by Friedrich Rochlitz (See Solomon 1991, Stafford 1991, pp. 243-248). But as it had a significant influence on the perception of Mozart’s creativity and of creativity in general, even if it is not original, it is worth analyzing it.  

When I am […] entirely alone, and of good cheer – say, traveling in a carriage or walking after a good meal, or during the night when I cannot sleep; it is often on such occasions that my ideas flow best and most abundantly. Whence and how they come, I know not, nor can I force them. (Quoted in Holmes 1845, p. 255.) 

Or, as Dostoyevsky put it, “a creative work comes suddenly, as a complete whole, finished and ready, out of the soul of a poet” (Quoted in Miller 1991, p. 49). The same intuition seems to be very powerful not only in the case of artistic, but also scientific creativity. As the mathematician Morris Kline writes:

The creative act owes little to logic or reason. In their accounts of the circumstances under which big ideas occurred to them, mathematicians have often mentioned that the inspiration had no relation to the work they happened to be doing. Sometimes it came while they were traveling, shaving or thinking about other matters. The creative process cannot be summoned at will. Kline 1955, p. 82, see also Schooler and Melcher 1995).. 

It is important to note that the intuition captured in these quotes is that it seems to us that creativity is not something we do but something that happens to us. This is a claim about our experience of our own creativity and it needs to be distinguished from a stronger claim about the nature of creativity itself: that creativity is in fact not something we do but something that happens to us. If we accept this stronger claim, then we can definitely explain why it seems to us that creativity is not something we do but something that happens to us, but this is not the only way to do so. And accepting the stronger claim moves us closer to attributing creativity either to divine intervention or to mysterious unconscious forces. The main point is that an account of creativity needs to be able to explain why it seems to us that creativity is not something we do but something that happens to us, even if we deny that it in fact is.  
	Functional/computational accounts have no simple explanation for this intuition: if creativity is a functional/computational mental phenomenon, why would it seem to us that it is not something we do but something that happens to us? Functional/computational accounts do not exclude the possibility of such explanation, but they do not provide one. 
The experiential account explains this intuition in a straightforward manner. If creative mental processes are accompanied by the experience of an idea as something we have not considered to be possible before, then it sounds plausible that the emergence of this idea that we have not considered to be possible before strikes us as something that happens to us and not as something we ourselves do; after all, a second ago we didn’t think it possible and now here it is. 

V. (b) Explaining why the experience of the appreciation of other people’s creativity can seemis similar to the experience of one’s own creativity.

A notable feature of creativity is that our experience of our own creativity can seemis similar to the appreciation of someone else’s creativity. If I am struggling to solve a math problem and I finally come up with a creative solution, what I experience is similar to my experience if, after much thinking, I give up and my friend gives me the creative solution. In both cases, what I experience is something like an ‘aha’ experience (see Koestler 1975, 1981): something like the experience of a novel solution I have not thought of before, regardless of whether it comes from me or from my friend. 
I take this to be a relatively uncontroversial feature of creativity, but it needs to be distinguished from some influential and much stronger claims in the vicinity. It has been argued that appreciating someone else’s creativity and being creative share some important features, both in the case of scientific and of artistic creativity. As the mathematician Jacob Bronowski writes: 

The appreciation of […] any creative acts is an act of re-creation. When the man makes you see the unexpected likeness, makes you feel it to be natural that this likeness exists, then you in your modest way are re-creating. You re-live the act of creation and that is why (in my view) appreciation is […] an activity of the same kind as the original act of creation, even though it is lower in intensity. (Bronowski 1985, p. 248, see also Carroll (this volume).) 

And here is a famous quote by Marcel Duchamp, who undoubtedly knew a thing or two about creativity: 

The creative act is not performed by the artist alone; the spectator brings the work in contact with the external world by deciphering and interpreting its inner qualification ad thus adds his contribution to the creative act. Duchamp 1957/1959, p. 78. 

Both Bronowski and Duchamp seem to suggest something stronger than what I take to be a notable feature of creativity. Bronowski assumes that genuine creativity and the appreciation of someone else’s creativity are processes ‘of the same kind’. Duchamp goes even further and seems to argue that the appreciation of someone else’s creativity is necessary for fully finishing her creative act. These are both stronger claims than the one I am making. 
All I claim is that the experience of one’s own creativity is similar to the experience of appreciating someone else’s creativity. This experiential similarity can be explained if we assume, with Bronowski, that the actual processes are also similar, but this is not the only way of doing so. Our experience of our own creativity may, after all, be similar to our experience of appreciating someone else’s creativity, but the underlying processes may be very different. In short, an account of creativity must be able to explain why the experience of one’s own creativity is similar to the experience of appreciating someone else’s creativity.
Functional/computational accounts face some difficulties explaining the apparent similarity between the experience of our own creativity and the appreciation of other people’s creativity. For the functional/computational account, if a mental process has certain functional/computational features, it is creative. If it doesn’t, it isn’t. Appreciating other people’s creativity is not being creative. Hence, our mental processes when appreciating other people’s creativity do not have the functional/computational features that make creative mental processes creative. But then how can we explain the similarity between our experience of our own creativity and our appreciation of other people’s creativity? 
A functional/computational account of creativity can, of course, be supplemented with an account of why the experience of appreciating other people’s creativity to is similar to the experience the functional/computational process in question gives rise to. But such explanation is not provided by the functional/computational accounts themselves. 
According to the experiential account, what is distinctive about creative mental processes is that they are accompanied by the experience of creativity: the experience of something that we have not thought to be possible before. And when we are appreciating someone else’s creativity, our mental processes are likely to be accompanied by an experience that is similar to this: I experience the idea that I just learned from Bill as something I have not thought to be possible before. In the ‘creativity’ case, I came up with the idea, in the ‘appreciating creativity’ case, someone else did. But in both cases, I experience this idea as something I have not thought to be possible before. The experiential account of creativity can explain both the similarities and the differences between being creative and appreciating other people’s creativity. 

V. (c) Explaining why we take creative actions to be genuine actions and not mere bodily movements.

Creative actions are genuine actions. They are not mere bodily movements. Hence, our theory of action, whatever it is, must apply to them. More precisely, we must be able to find whatever makes actions genuine actions, that is, more than mere bodily movements, both in the case of non-creative and in the case of creative actions. 
	But what makes actions more than just bodily movements? Whatever it is that makes the difference, it must be a mental state that triggers, or maybe accompanies, the bodily movements. If bodily movements are triggered (or accompanied) by mental states of a certain kind, they qualify as actions. If they are not, they are mere bodily movements. 
	The big question is of course what mental states are the ones that trigger (or accompany) actions. The most popular candidate is intention. The standard way of explaining the difference between actions and mere bodily movements is that while the former are triggered by intentions, the latter are not. If I form an intention to raise my arm and this intention triggers the bodily movement of my arm going up, this makes it a genuine action. If the same bodily movement is triggered by a neuro-scientist fiddling with my brain and not by my intention, then we talk about a mere bodily movement. 
	Without getting lost in the jungle of philosophy of action, it is important to point out that, at least on the face of it, this account does not fit well with creative actions. In the case of creative actions, we do not have an intention to do Q before we do Q. If we did, the action would not be creative: it would be the mechanicalstic execution of an already existing plan. As John Hospers says: 

In creative activity you do not know when you begin the activity what the end-product will be like. (Hospers 1985, p. 244, see also Hintz 1958, Vincent 1964, 1993) 

There are (at least) three ways of modifying the account of what makes creative actions genuine actions in a way that would avoid this problem. The first one is to point out that the content of the intention that triggers an action is normally more coarse-grained that the content of the action, not just in the case of creative, but also of non-creative actions. It has been argued that before we begin performing an action, we have only a vague idea about how to perform it (Bach 1978, Brand 1984, Pacherie 2001). When I am scratching an itch, for example, I only have a very vague idea as to where exactly I should scratch, but as I am performing the action, as I receive a lot of feedback about my scratching attempts, my representation of the whereabouts of the itch becomes more and more determinate. And one could argue that creative actions work the same way. When I am trying to solve a math problem, I do have some kind of intention with some vague content (of solving the problem). I do not have any more specific intention as to how to do so. So the asymmetry between the less determinate content of intention and the more determinate content of action is there both in the case of non-creative and in the case of creative actions. 
A problem with this solution is that it only works in the case of one kind of creative action, one that Berys Gaut calls ‘active creativity’: when we are “consciously trying out different approaches” in order to perform a creative action (Gaut 2003, p. 156). If our action is ‘passively creative’, then there is no intention that would trigger our creative action, as in these cases, we are not trying to do anything, the creative idea or action just ‘pops into our head’ (Gaut 2003, p. 156). Actions that are passively creative do not seem to be preceded, and triggered, by any intention, regardless of the individuation of the content of this intention. 
The second way of accounting for the fact that creative actions are genuine actions is to abandon the idea that the mental state that makes actions genuine actions is a prior intention. There are many ways of doing this. John Searle famously differentiated prior intentions from intentions in action (Searle 1983, pp. 83-98, see esp. p. 93). The former is not necessary for actions, whereas the latter is. In the case of some actions, the bodily movement is not caused by any prior intention, but it is caused by an intention-in-action. When I suddenly stand up from my desk and start pacing around my office, I have not formed a prior intention to do so. Nevertheless it is a genuine action as my bodily movement is caused by my intention-in-action. Maybe we should analyze creative actions in a similar way. 
Even if we have doubts about Searle’s concept of intention in action (see O'Shaughnessy 1991), this way of explaining what makes creative actions genuine actions may be the most fruitful one. The idea is that the mental state that makes actions genuine actions and not mere bodily movement is not a state that occurs before the action is performed, but something that occurs at the same time as when the action is performed. Some possible candidates besides Searle’s intention in action include Kent Bach’s ‘executive representation’ (Bach 1978), Myles Brand’s ‘immediate intentions’ (Brand 1984), John Perry’s ‘belief-how’ (Israel et al. 1993) and dynamic action schemas (Jeannerod 1997, see also the discussion of Carruthers 2002, 2008 in the context of creativity). 
The third way of resisting the problem in hand would be to deny that actions can be genuinely creative. Maybe creative actions are ones that are triggered by creative intentions. There is nothing creative about the execution of the intention. The locus of creativity is not the action itself, but the mental process that precedes the action. Some support for this way out could be drawn from Mozart’s famous (but, again, probably misattributed) self-report: 

The committing to paper is done quickly enough, for everything is already finished; and it rarely differs on paper from what it was in my imagination. (Letter to Baron von P… Quoted in Holmes 1845, p. 255.)

What is creative here is not the ‘committing to paper’, but the idea that was there in his mind before he started ‘committing it to paper’. Although some creative actions are undoubtedly just boring executions of genuinely creative ideas, it does not seem likely that this is true of all creative actions. Notable examples include the creativity of improvisations in jazz and modern dance. When one is improvising, one does not seem to have a creative idea that then one executes (Berliner 1994, see Carruthers 2008, pp. 257-258 for an excellent summary). The creativity seems to be part of the improvised act itself. 
	To sum up, there seems to be some tension between the very idea of creative actions and the mainstream accounts of what makes actions genuine actions and not mere bodily movements. This tension may be interesting to explore from a philosophy of action point of view and examine in what ways the possibility of genuinely creative actions puts constraints on our theories of action. I will not do this here, as this paper is about creativity and not the theory of action. What I am interested in is which accounts of creativity make the least dubious assumptions about philosophy of action. 
What can the functional/computational accounts of creativity say about this problem? The mental state that is supposed to make an action a genuine action and not a mere bodily movement is supposed to be a functional/computational state, like intention (whether it is prior intention or intention in action). It is individuated in functional terms. Thus, the functional/computational accounts of creativity hold that what makes creative actions creative is a functional/computational state and what makes creative actions genuine actions is also a functional/computational state. 
In other words, according to the functional/computational account, whatever mental state makes our creative actions creative must also make our creative actions genuine actions. There is no contradiction here: a certain kind of mental state makes our actions genuine actions and some of these mental states also make our creative actions creative. But although there is nothing contradictory here, this picture does put constraints on what a functional/computational account can say about the set of mental (functional/computational) states that make creative actions genuine actions and not mere bodily movements: as at least some of these mental states must also be able to make our creative actions creative. And the most plausible candidates for what mental states that make our creative actions genuine actions are very different from do not seem to overlap with the most plausible candidates for what mental states that make our creative actions creative. 
As according to the experiential account, what is distinctive about creative actions is the way they are experienced, there are no such constraints. What makes actions genuine actions is something functional/computational, but what is distinctive about creative actions is something experiential: the two questions are orthogonal to one another. 
In other words, if we accept the experiential account of creativity, no assumptions are made about the grand question in philosophy of action about what makes actions genuine actions. If we accept a functional/computational account, the moves to make explain how creative actions qualify as genuine actions will be limited. 

VI. Conclusion: Creativity and originality reconsidered

It is time to return to the relation between creativity and originality. I argued in Section II that creativity and originality are very different concepts: creativity is a non-observable feature of our mental processes, whereas originality is an (at least in principle) observable feature of the product of our mental processes. I also argued that creativity is neither necessary nor sufficient for originality. The account I outlined here is an account of creativity. But what, if anything, does it tell us about originality?
	Suppose that I am fully informed about the state of my field: I know exactly what ideas have been explored. And now I have a creative idea. According to my account, this idea is experienced as something I have not thought to be possible before and this experience is veridical. But if I am really fully informed about my field, then it follows that this idea is not only creative; it is also original. Thus, my account of creativity helps us to understand how the concept of creativity and that of originality are related to one another (and why they are so easily confused). 
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^1	  It is important to note the difference between the subjective versus objective/inter-subjective distinction and Boden’s contrast between P-creativity and H-creativity. While subjective and objective/inter-subjective creativity are attributes of different entities, of mental processes and products, respectively, Boden’s distinction is supposed to be neutral about the entity we are attributing creativity to. A product can be P-creative if it is created by a P-creative thought process. And a mental process or idea can be H-creative if it has not occurred before. On the differences between Boden’s and D’Agostino’s distinctions, see also Novitz 1999, p. 70, footnote 6.
^2	  In the case of artworks originality is also used in another sense: we talk about an original Vermeer as opposed to a fake Vermeer. I am interested in the concept of originality per se (and not of being an original Vermeer, Cézanne, etc). 
^3	  This is not meant as a necessary and sufficient condition. If a mental process is creative, it is not mechanical. But a mental process can be non-mechanical and still fail to count as creative. 
^4	  It is often claimed that novelty is a necessary feature of creativity. My contrast between creativity and originality is supposed to highlight that we may not need to accept this as an unquestionable assumption. As we shall see, the concept of novelty will be very important for characterizing creativity, but in a less straightforward way than it is normally assumed. In contrast, novelty is clearly necessary for originality. 
^5	  I will also talk about ‘creative ideas’, by which I merely mean ‘ideas that are the outcome of creative mental processes’. This, as we have seen, is very different from ‘original ideas’.
^6	  One could, of course, defend one of these functional/computational accounts from the alleged counterexamples (Novitz 2003 attempted to do exactly this).
^7	  Note that Boden would probably agree with these last two claims (see also Stokes 2007, 2008 for a similar pluralist approach). She would nonetheless pitch her account of creativity on the functional/computational level. 
^8	  Note that this additional veridicality condition does not make my account fall back to Boden’s original necessary condition for (radical) creativity: My condition is that I experience an idea as something I have not taken to be possible before. If we add the veridicality condition, what we get is that this idea is something I have not taken to be possible before. Contrast this with Boden’s condition, according to which this idea is something I could not have had before. The scope of the modality operator is very different in these two claims. 
^9	  I am grateful for comments from Peter Carruthers, Laura Franklin-Hall, Scott Barry Kaufman, Matthew Kieran, Philip Kitcher, Elliot Paul, Dustin Stokes, Achille Varzi, and especially Elliot Paul.
